XRP and Quantum Computing: The 2035 Deadline for Wallet Signatures

Every time you confirm an XRP transaction, your wallet produces a digital signature that proves you own the account. A US government standards document has now put a date on the algorithms behind those signatures: 2035. Both of the signing methods the XRP Ledger supports are on that list.

The video reads the actual documents rather than the headlines. It corrects a common misunderstanding about quantum computers and crypto, explains what the deadline really is, and covers a step David Schwartz has described for reducing exposure on your own account.

What does the 2035 deadline actually say?

It comes from NIST Internal Report 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards,” published in November 2024. NIST decides which cryptography US federal systems may use, which in practice shapes what much of the world builds around.

One caveat up front: the report is an initial public draft. It says so on every page, and its dates are proposed, not final.

Table 2 on page 13 lists quantum-vulnerable digital signature algorithms:

Algorithm	Security strength	Proposed status
ECDSA	112 bits	Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035
ECDSA	128 bits or more	Disallowed after 2035
EdDSA	128 bits or more	Disallowed after 2035
RSA	Not specified in the video	Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035

The two terms differ. Deprecated means an algorithm can still be used if someone accepts the risk. Disallowed means it may no longer be used for that purpose. A third term, legacy use, allows an algorithm only to verify existing signatures, not create new ones.

The 2035 date isn’t NIST’s invention. NIST quotes National Security Memorandum 10, which sets the goal of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by 2035. That makes it a presidential policy target.

Which signature does your XRP account use?

The XRP Ledger supports exactly two signing algorithms: secp256k1, which is ECDSA, and Ed25519, which is EdDSA. Both are on NIST’s table. Bitcoin uses secp256k1 as well.

You can check your account in about a minute:

1. Open any XRP Ledger explorer.
2. Find a transaction you have sent.
3. Look at the signing public key. If it starts with ED, it’s Ed25519. If it starts with 02 or 03, it’s secp256k1.

Can quantum computers “harvest now, decrypt later” your XRP?

No, and the video calls this the most common misunderstanding. Harvest now, decrypt later is a real threat for encrypted data: someone records it today and cracks it once a powerful enough quantum computer exists. A House Homeland Security Committee hearing shown in the video said adversaries are already collecting encrypted data for this reason.

Signatures are different. NIST’s report says that, unlike encryption, an authentication system remains secure as long as the algorithms and keys are secure at the moment the authentication is performed. Nobody can record your transaction today and use it to steal your coins in 2040.

The same paragraph continues: once quantum computers capable of breaking these algorithms exist, authentication using them “will need to be disabled.” You are fine until that point, and the response at that point is to switch the scheme off, not patch it.

Why blockchains face a coordination problem

For a bank, disabling an algorithm is a software rollout it can schedule. A blockchain can only reach agreement. Disabling a signature scheme on the XRP Ledger or on Bitcoin requires validators, node operators, exchanges, wallet software and custodians to move roughly together. Accounts whose owners have died, lost their keys or aren’t paying attention would never move at all.

BlackRock flagged this in an SEC filing. The video searched the July 2025 version of the iShares Bitcoin Trust prospectus and found “quantum” eight times. One passage warns that quantum computing could make Bitcoin’s cryptography ineffective and allow a malicious actor to compromise the trust’s wallets. The next says there is no guarantee quantum-proof changes will be implemented in time, and that they could require broad consensus, one or more forks, and “no assurance consensus would be achieved.”

What is Ripple doing about it?

On April 20, 2026, Ripple published “Post-quantum readiness on the XRP Ledger,” a four-phase plan ending in a full transition to post-quantum signatures. Ripple wrote that it has milestones for the first half of 2026 and is targeting full transition no later than 2028.

Put the three dates side by side:

1. 2028: Ripple’s target for the XRP Ledger
2. 2030: NIST’s proposed deprecation of the weaker ECDSA variant
3. 2035: NIST’s proposed disallowance of all four families, in line with the presidential target

If Ripple meets 2028, the ledger would be ready seven years before the 2035 date. If it slips, a public ledger could end up running on cryptography federal systems are no longer allowed to use.

What David Schwartz said about quantum risk

In August 2022, David Schwartz, who designed the XRP Ledger, said the XRPL is not quantum resistant. It could be made so, he said, but current quantum-resistant algorithms have painful disadvantages in blockchain applications. His approach was to monitor the field and implement the best algorithms when the risk looks to be within about five years. He said at the time he didn’t think we were there yet. The video notes this answer is four years old and that Ripple’s roadmap is now the current position.

Schwartz also made a practical point. Cold wallets that hold only XRP and have never sent a transaction are already quantum resistant. An XRP address is derived by hashing the public key, and the public key only appears on the ledger the first time you sign something. Owning coins doesn’t create the exposure; spending them does. The same is true of Bitcoin.

For accounts that have already transacted, Schwartz described another option: disable the master key and set a new regular key. The account is then quantum resistant until it sends another transaction, after which the key can be changed again. XRP Ledger documentation confirms that the master key is permanently tied to the address and can be disabled but not removed, while a regular key can be replaced at any time. The video deliberately doesn’t walk through the steps, because a mistake can lock you out of your account permanently.

What about hardware wallets?

NIST’s report notes that hardware modules must be upgraded or redesigned to support post-quantum algorithms, which have larger keys and different computing needs. The security chip in a hardware wallet was designed around today’s algorithms, so the device itself is part of the transition too.

Three questions to check on your own account

1. Which signature scheme does your account use? Look at the first two characters of the signing public key on a transaction you’ve sent.
2. Has the account ever sent a transaction? If so, its public key is on the ledger permanently. If it genuinely never has, it falls into the category Schwartz described as already quantum resistant.
3. When did you last check where your coins sit, rather than what they are worth?

What to watch next

The video’s conclusion is that 2035 isn’t a prediction about when a quantum computer will exist. It is the date an algorithm stops being allowed, an administrative act that happens on a calendar either way. The real risk is coordination. Watch whether Ripple hits its first-half 2026 milestones and its 2028 target, whether NIST finalizes the draft dates, and whether your wallet software announces post-quantum support.